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ISLAM, THE WEST, AND THE
RULE OF LAW
Mark David Welton*
In the 21st century, the security of the United States, the
defeat of terror, the end of tyranny, and the peace of the world
depend on the advance of liberty in other nations, and this ad-
vance will be achieved by promoting democracy. Democracy
leads to liberty, and liberty leads to peace and freedom. This is
a paraphrase from a recent speech by the President of the
United States of America.1 A few months later, on the other
side of the world, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
offered a different perspective in a letter to President Bush:
Liberalism and Western-style democracy have not been able
to help realize the ideals of humanity. Today these two concepts
have failed. Those with insight can already hear the sounds of
the shattering and fall of the ideology and thoughts of the liberal
* Professor of International and Comparative Law, United States Military
Academy, West Point, New York. The text of this paper was delivered as the 2007
Blaine Sloan Lecture at Pace University School of Law in conjunction with a sym-
posium entitled "Interpreting Islam for the Western World." The opinions ex-
pressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the United States Military Academy, the Department of Defense, or the
U.S. government.
1 See George W. Bush, President Discusses Freedom and Democracy in Iraq,
Speech at the Dorothy Betts Marvin Theatre, The George Washington University
(March 13, 2006), transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2006/03/20060313-3.html. President Bush stated:
The mission of this Foundation [for the Defense of Democracies] is to de-
feat terror by promoting democracy - and that is the mission of my ad-
ministration. Our strategy to protect America is based on a clear premise:
the security of our nation depends on the advance of liberty in other na-
tions. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw that problems originating in
a failed and oppressive state 7,000 miles away could bring murder and
destruction to our country. We saw that dictatorships shelter terrorists,
feed resentment and radicalism, and threaten the security of free nations.
Democracies replace resentment with hope, democracies respect the
rights of their citizens and their neighbors, democracies join the fight
against terror. And so America is committed to an historic, long-term goal:
To secure the peace of the world, we seek the end of tyranny in our world.
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democratic systems. Whether we like it or not, the world is gravi-
tating towards faith in the Almighty and justice and the will of
God will prevail over all things.2
Persians, like Arabs, are heirs to a great literary tradition;
they choose their words carefully, and President Ahmadinejad's
rebuttal to President Bush is clear: liberal democracy is a West-
ern value incompatible with Islam. We are tempted to ask if
any further evidence is needed to validate Samuel Huntington's
thesis that the Western and Islamic worlds are engaged in a
fundamental "clash of civilizations. 3
However, our postmodern awareness should caution
against accepting such politically convenient but misleading di-
chotomies. Like the West, the Islamic world is hardly mono-
lithic. A multitude of political views can be found within the
many cultures, ethnicities, languages, and religious variations
that exist where Islam is the dominant faith. It has been accu-
rately noted that the violent upheavals in the world of Islam are
more a manifestation of internal conflicts working themselves
out within the Islamic community, the umma, as it searches for
an authentic voice in the new century, than a result of a clash of
beliefs, principles, and values with the West.4 The contesting
voices of liberal, radical, traditional, moderate, militant, and
conservative Islam - the list of possible appellations is long -
can be heard in virtually every country where Muslims live.
Certainly the post-Saddam Iraqi national elections, as well as
the recent city council elections in Iran, which were widely seen
as a rebuff to government hard-liners, 5 demonstrate that de-
mocracy has a place even in the Islamic heartland, President
Ahmadinejad's assertions notwithstanding.
Nor are the Western and Islamic worlds themselves any
longer geographically distinct. The Muslim population in Eu-
rope and North America is large and growing, and the first
Muslim candidate was recently elected to the United States
2 Elaine Sciolino, From Iran, With Something Less Than Love, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2006, § 4 at 5 (quoting the letter from President Mahnoud Ahmedinejad
to President George Bush).
3 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER (1996).
4 See REZA ASLAN, No GOD BUT GOD: THE ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND FUTURE
OF ISLAM (2005).
5 See A Rebuff for the President; Iran, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2006.
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Congress. 6 Some 600,000 Muslims live in New York City,
where their imams respond to a multitude of social, religious
and legal questions and problems that arise within their com-
munity.7 Hejab, the proper attire for Muslim women, is a sig-
nificant issue not just in Tehran,8 but also in the streets of
Blackburn, England9 and the schools of Paris, France.10 In the
other direction, the post-colonial penetration of Islamic Africa
and Asia by the West - economically, militarily, and culturally
- continues to deepen, with all the benefits and problems that
such encounters engender.
Nevertheless, there are important differences in Islamic
and Western perceptions of the "Other" that must be acknowl-
edged. Here again, postmodern thought requires that we pay
close attention to problems of language. In the West, especially
since 2001, the world of Islam, suddenly prominent in the me-
dia and popular imagination, is often perceived and portrayed
in terms like stagnation, oppression, and terrorism. Books
about Islam on my library shelves, sandwiched between more
specialized academic works, contain words in their titles such
as "rage,"11 "trouble,"1 2 " radical," 3 "crisis,"14 "war,"1 5 and
"wrong."16 In the Islamic world, words may carry significance
that pose difficulties for Western comprehension beyond those
of translation. For example, the word "martyr" has an histori-
6 In November, 2006, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, a Muslim, was elected to
the U.S. House of Representatives. See First Muslim Congressman Elected, BBC
NEWS, Nov. 8, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6127234.stm.
7 See generally Andrea Elliott, An Imam in America: A Muslim Leader in
Brooklyn, Reconciling 2 Worlds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at Al; Andrea Elliot, An
Imam in America: To Lead the Faithful in a Faith Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2006, at Al; Andrea Elliot, An Imam in America: Tending to Muslim Hearts and
Islam's Future, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at Al.
8 See Neil MacFarquhar, Iranian Women's Dress Code is Modest but Golf
Friendly, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 2005, at A6.
9 See Deconstructing the Veil, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2006,.
10 See The War of the Headscarves - Integrating Minorities, ECONOMIST, Feb.
7, 2004,.
11 ROBIN WRIGHT, SACRED RAGE: THE WRATH OF MILITANT ISLAM (1985).
12 IRsHAD MANJI, THE TROUBLE WITH ISLAM (2003).
13 RADICAL ISLAM'S RULES (Paul Marshall ed., 2005).
14 BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM: HOLY WAR AND UNHOLY TERROR
(2003).
15 GILLES KEPEL, THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS: ISLAM AND THE WEST (2004).
16 BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG? WESTERN IMPACT AND MIDDLE EAST-
ERN RESPONSE (2002).
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cal, religious, and political context of meaning within Shi'ism 17
that puzzles many Westerners who wonder at the motivation of
children who use their bodies to clear minefields and detonate
bombs.
Political words are especially problematic. "Democracy,"
highlighted by President Bush's speech and President
Ahmadinejad's letter, is a high-value term loaded with positive
connotations for Americans and Europeans. It resonates with
Muslims in the Middle East, too, when elections offer the oppor-
tunity to express dissent or desire for change, as previously
noted in Iraq and Iran. But the same term, used so indiscrimi-
nately by Western politicians, is also widely perceived in the
Arab Middle East as a codeword, a "guise for Western efforts to
reconquer Arab territories and plunder their natural re-
sources."18 America's past and current support for authorita-
rian regimes in Arab countries seems to undermine our
expressed commitment to the spread of democracy throughout
the Middle East. In Iranian minds, America's fidelity to democ-
racy is belied by the still-fresh recollection of the American-en-
gineered overthrow of the popular, democratically-elected
government of Mohammad Mosaddeq and the reinstallation of
the Shah in 1953. Our common roots in monotheistic religious
tradition seem overwhelmed by the historical baggage and con-
tradictions that attend our words and practices.
Must we then submit ourselves to a post-modern resigna-
tion that denies the possibility of meaningful communication
across the divisions between the West and the Islamic world?
Here, I suggest that the concept embodied in the term "rule of
law" is in fact a legal and political value shared by both the
West and Islam, and if properly refined, can provide a useful
framework for more effective discourse and understanding be-
tween these two traditions.
As Fareed Zakaria has written, "[e]veryone accepts that
'the rule of law' is the foundation of liberties in the Western
17 See generally A. Ezzati, The Concept of Martyrdom in Islam, http://www.al-
islam.org/al-serat/concept-ezzati.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008); Reza Aslan, In the
Footsteps of the Martyrs, SLATE, Feb. 16, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2095326/.
18 Uriya Shavit, The Road to Democracy in the Arab World, AZURE (Autumn
5767/2006), at 44, available at http://www.azure.org.il/download/magazine/2154AZ
_26_Shavit.pdf.
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world."19 Though critical jurisprudence questions the possibil-
ity of a meaningful rule of law, one astute scholar of the subject
has correctly observed that "there appears to be widespread
agreement, traversing all fault lines, on one point, and one
point alone: that the 'rule of law' is good for everyone. Among
Western states this belief is orthodoxy."20 American constitu-
tions - state and federal - "are specifically rooted in an English
constitutionalism based on the rule of law."21 The preamble to
the Treaty on European Union affirms the members' primary
commitment to the rule of law.22
The Islamic world, too, has a devotion to the rule of law
that has prevailed through much of its history and, while se-
verely impaired in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by
Western colonialism and its aftermath, has resurfaced as a de-
sired virtue, fully compatible with Islamic law and tradition. In
1999, Abdurrahman Wahid, the president of Indonesia (the
world's largest Muslim country), cited the establishment of the
rule of law as one of his major achievements. 23 After the fall of
the Taliban, an Afghan tribal leader and notorious warlord
campaigned for a government position on the platform urging
"now is the time to defend ourselves not with tanks and armed
corps but by the rule of law."24 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a recent
candidate for the Egyptian presidency, cited the rule of law as
the key to the evolution of political Islam.25 There are many
other examples.
Perhaps most significant in this regard is the recent Ira-
nian presidency of Mohammad Khatami. A mid-level cleric in
the Shi'ite hierarchy, he is nevertheless a recognized scholar of
19 Fareed Zakaria, The Enemy Within, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW, Dec.17 2006,
at 8 (reviewing JOHN Yoo, WAR By OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE
WAR ON TERROR (2006) and BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATrACK: PRE-
SERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006).
20 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 1
(2004).
21 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 150 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002).
22 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, pmbl. (Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, 1992).
23 JOHN L. ESPOSITO & JOHN 0. VOLL, MAKERS OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAM 114
(2001); TAMANAHA, supra note 20, at 2.
24 TAMANAHA, supra note 20, at 2.
25 See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Islam Can Vote, If We Let It, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2005, at A13.
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both Islamic and Western legal and political philosophies. 26
The main theme of his overwhelmingly successful 1997 election
campaign was the institutionalization in Iran of the rule of law
and the development of civil society 27 within the framework of
the Shari'a.28 Although the rule of law reforms promoted dur-
ing his presidency and eagerly anticipated by a large majority of
the Iranian people were unsuccessful in the near-term, as dis-
cussed later, the long-term impact of his eight-year tenure and
his call for a dialogue of civilizations based on the rule of law
may yet prove to be his most important legacy.
So what is the rule of law, and is it a concept on which the
West and the Islamic world can find common ground to begin a
more productive dialogue of civilizations that President
Khatami proposed? Let's first summarize briefly what the rule
of law has come to mean in the Western legal tradition.
There is no lack of scholarly debate in Western legal
thought about the meaning of the rule of law. 29 Nevertheless,
26 Khatami's published works (in Persian) include, among others, RELIGION
AND INTELLECT TRAPPED IN TYRANNY (2000), FROM THE WORLD OF THE CITY TO THE
CITY OF THE WORLD (1994), and FEAR OF THE WAVE (1993). A selection of addresses
and quotes in English can be found in MOHAMMAD KHATAMI, HOPE AND CHAL-
LENGE: THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT SPEAKS (Alidad Mafinezam trans., 1997).
27 ALI M. ANSARI, IRAN, ISLAM, AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING
CHANGE 125-26 (2000).
28 The Shari'a:
is the expression of the will of Allah manifested in his guidance of
Muhammad and preserved by the community in their scripture, the
Qur'an .... Each individual who personally chooses to obey [Allah] di-
rectly confronts the divine will expressed in the Shari'a and strives to con-
duct his or her life according to that imperative .... The law, as the
concrete expression of Allah's will and guidance, is therefore central to the
individual and collective Muslim identity. It constitutes the sole
blueprint for the good society.
DAVID WAINES, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 63 (2d ed.1995).
29 See THE RULE OF LAW (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (containing a collection of
essays on the meaning of the rule of law); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF
LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999) (contrasting views on the
dimensions of the rule of law in a cultural framework); RICHARD POSNER, FRON-
TIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 182-92 (2001) (a critique of Kahn's broad view). The possi-
bility of the rule of law is questioned by much critical and postmodern legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Morton Horowitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human
Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977); Joel Edan Friedlander, The Rule of Law at Cen-
tury's End, 5 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 317 (2001); Jeffrey E. Thomas, Symposium: The
Law and Popular Culture: Legal Culture and the Practice: A Postmodern Depiction
of the Rule of Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1495 (2001); Francis J. Mootz, III, Rethinking
[Vol. 19:169
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beyond the generally accepted notion that an important purpose
of the rule of law is to limit arbitrary governmental power,
there are at least three modern approaches to identifying the
elements of the rule of law: a narrow approach, a middle ap-
proach, and a broad approach.30
The narrow approach restricts itself to the characteristics
of the rules, and of the rule-making and rule-enforcement proce-
dures, in a legal system.3 ' Often depicted as formal legality,
and as elaborated on more fully by Lon Fuller and Joseph Raz,
among many others, it insists that the rule of law means that
legal rules, and the procedures that create, change, and enforce
these rules, should have certain characteristics, namely: clarity,
prospective applicability, stability, and publicity of rules; trans-
parent law-making guided by clear and stable general rules; ac-
cessibility to the courts; basic procedural due process; and rule-
based restraints on the activities of law-enforcement agencies. 32
These are characteristics of legal rules and procedures that al-
low people to plan for the future with reasonable assurance that
the rules of the road will not suddenly and secretly change.
They are expressly not to be equated with other virtues such as
the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that the Obvious is Possible, 61 TENN. L. REV. 69
(1993).
30 See RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA (2001). Cass states:
At one extreme, a starkly positivist conception of the rule of law encom-
passes the notion of control to whatever extent and by whatever means
the state chooses so long as certain formal requisites of laws' enactment
and application are met. It is a conception of law-boundedness irrespec-
tive of the ends served by law .... At another extreme are conceptions of
the rule of law that would make the concept synonymous with justice.
These conceptions see the widespread appeal of the rule of law as depen-
dent on the morality of the laws that rule .... In between the extreme
views are numerous particular conceptions of the rule of law differing in
the ends the concept serves and the requisites imposed in the concept's
name.
Id. at 1-2. See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT
(1996). There are in fact two versions of the rule of law, a modest version of adher-
ing to the rules and a more lofty ideal that incorporates criteria of justice. We
shuffle back and forth between them because we are unsure of the import of the
term 'law' in the expression 'rule of law.' Id. at 11.
31 See CAss, supra note 30, at 1-2.
32 See id. at 1; see also FLETCHER, supra note 30, at 11-14.
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democracy, justice, or human rights. 33 This is essentially a pro-
cedural, rather than a substantive, approach to the rule of law.
The middle approach, like the narrow view, usually rejects
the inclusion of qualities such as justice as too subjective to con-
stitute a necessary element of the rule of law.34 Yet the middle
approach also requires more than certain formal characteristics
of rules and rule-making.35 This approach often insists that
constitutionalism must be present within a rule of law sys-
tem.36 Constitutionalism in a rule of law context consists of a
structural design of the political system that distributes govern-
mental power, usually focused on separation of legislative and
executive powers and especially on an independent judiciary ca-
pable of exercising some form of judicial review. 37 It also re-
quires an intangible but deep-seated commitment to the
supremacy of law by both the governed and the government. 38
33 See JOSEPH RAz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 211-14 (1979). Raz insists that the rule of law "is
not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise),
human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man ..." Id.
at 211. "[TIhe law must be capable of guiding the behavior of its subjects .... It
says nothing about fundamental rights, about equality, or justice." Id. at 214. See
also FLETCHER, supra note 30, at 11-14; LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
(1964).
34 See generally, CASS, supra note 30, at 2.
35 See id.
36 LARRY ALEXANDER, CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 4
(1998). "Constitutionalism implements the rule of law: It brings about predict-
ability and security in the relations of individuals to the government by defining in
advance the powers and limits of that government." Id. Andrew Altman identifies
five principles of the rule of law, the first and last of which are aspects of
constitutionalism:
1. Government must operate under the law. 2. Government must regulate
society through a system of general and authoritative rules. 3. The gen-
eral and authoritative rules should give individuals fair warning [by be-
ing] (a) made public, (b) reasonably clear in meaning and specific in what
they prohibit, (c) in force for a reasonable period of time, (d) applied pro-
spectively, (e) applied impartially, (f) possible to comply with, and (g) en-
acted in accordance with preexisting legal rules. 4. All persons must be
given due process, that is a fair chance to defend themselves against for-
mal charges that they have violated the rules. 5. The sovereign people
ought to establish constitutional government and abide by its laws.
ANDREW ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW 7 (2d ed. 2001).
37 Raz includes judicial review as one of the principles in his narrow view of
the rule of law, but notes that "in itself it is a very limited review - merely to
ensure conformity to the rule of law." RAZ, supra note 33, at 217.
38 See id.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss2/2
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This latter requirement has frequently been expressed in terms
of a civic reverence towards the law by all the actors within the
system.3 9
39 Constitutionalism was defined by Walter Hamilton in 1930 as "the name
given to the trust which men repose in the power of words engrossed on parchment
to keep a government in order." Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in
ALEXANDER, CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 36, at
16. Ulrich Preuss has also expressed an understanding of the requirement for a
bond between the people and the law as the essential element of constitutionalism.
The distinctiveness of constitutionalism is:
not to be found in certain ideas or institutional devices, ingenious as they
may be, like, for example, the idea of the separation of powers, or the con-
ception of the accountability of the rulers vis-d-vis the ruled; the essence
of constitutionalism which has prompted both the admiration and the con-
stant reasoning of the most spirited political philosophers of many centu-
ries is the mystery of its binding force.
Ulrich K. Preuss, The Political Meaning of Constitutionalism: British, French, and
American Perspectives, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 531 (John Arthur
and William H. Shaw eds., 4th ed. 2006). See also James W. Torke, What is This
Thing Called the Rule of Law? 34 IND. L. REV. 1445 (2001). Torke views the com-
ponents of the rule of law as constraints on state power that operate at three levels
(as if in a pyramid). See id. at 1448. The top level consists of formal constraints of
rules and texts (such as constitutions, statutes, regulations, doctrines, and deci-
sions). See id. The middle level consists of institutional constraints, such as con-
stitutionalism, open governmental processes, judicial review, a free press,
decentralized law publishers, and widespread access to legal education resulting in
an independent legal profession. See id. The bottom level, on which the other two
constraints rest, consists of the informal constraints derived from a "rule of law
culture." Id. This means that the law is "the ruling myth of our civic faith," ac-
cepted by all as definitive of what governs us. Id. Although Torke places constitu-
tionalism on a different level from the informal constraints of the "rule of law
culture," others more commonly combine them. Semonche states that "American
nationhood rests upon a common faith in a civil theology .. .housed within the
concept of a rule of law." JOHN SEMONCHE, KEEPING THE FAITH: A CULTURAL His-
TORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1998). He goes on to note that "the writing at the
pinnacle of the civil religion's theological hierarchy is the Constitution," with the
U.S. Supreme Court the "priestly interpreter of the holy writ." Id. at 7. On the
other hand, Posner's critique of Kahn's theory of the cultural study of law (and by
implication of Semonche's vision of a "civic religion") centers on Kahn's promotion
of this aspect of constitutionalism as necessary to the rule of law. Posner, who
subscribes to the narrow view of the rule of law, asserts that:
the law plays an essentially pragmatic role in social governance .... its
success in this role depends on a degree of adherence to such rule of law
virtues as impartiality, impersonality, publicity, and predictability. But
[Americans] don't think of their commitment to the rule of law as some-
thing that 'defines' themselves as Americans .... Law is not our civic
religion; freedom, work, wealth, and religion are .... The rule of law is
both more and less than myth.
POSNER, supra note 29, at 191-92.
9
PACE INT'L L. REV [Vol. 19:169
The broad approach also consists of rules with particular
character, as well as constitutionalism, but adds additional
qualitative elements to the legal system.40 These may include
respect for human rights and inviolability of private property.
However, this approach most consistently focuses on the re-
quirement for justice to exist in and be served by the legal sys-
tem.41  Although many scholars argue for the inclusion of
40 See CASS, supra note 30, at 2.
41 A broad conception of the rule of law is reflected in the following:
If the rule of law remains the one rational tool of mankind standing be-
tween anarchy and total oppression, it must be responsive to the ethical
sense of fairness and justice of those it governs. Without this ethical un-
derpinning the best that can be said for the rule of law is that its main
function is to maintain order, and it matters not what type of order is
maintained. An essential purpose of a true rule of law, therefore, is that
the members of the legal community are willing to live together under
rules which embody the value of order and the value of justice .... These
then are the attributes of a true rule of law: a society or community con-
sensus seeking to secure justice - that which is felt to be right, reasonable,
and proportionate for a particular time and place; and order which re-
quires continuity, certainty, consistency - a balance between rights and
duties, effectiveness and restraint on power, plus the ability to meet
changing conditions.
ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A. J. THOMAS, JR., A WORLD RULE OF LAW 4-5, 8
(1975). See also JENNIFER A. WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW 27 (2001). Wid-
ner notes that:
Both the rule of law and judicial independence had attracted attention in
the late 1950s and early 1960s, although then, as now, the terms were
difficult to define. In the popular imagination, rule of law usually con-
noted the antithesis of disorder, vigilantism, corruption, abuse of power,
and arbitrariness. Lawyers distilled three important elements from this
mix. One concern was for predictability and publicity. No one should be
... punished or disadvantaged by the retrospective application of a new
standard; rules should be public, not secret, so that people could reasona-
bly know them. A second concern was for "due process," the opportunity
for a fair hearing. To have one's story told by an impartial adjudicator
was an entitlement that lay at the foundation of most justice systems,
including those in Africa. Third, the concept of the rule of law also con-
tained an appeal to a sense of fairness not satisfied by a "law of rules"
based solely on adherence to statutes and careful attention to procedure.
Content or substance mattered too. As the example of apartheid in South
Africa brought home forcefully, due process in the presence of abhorrent
statutes also offended the sense of justice.
Id. at 27. In discussing the rule of law as a unifying principle of American society,
Semonche has stated that "to describe a rule of law without talk of justice, equal-
ity, and common decency - as has so often been done - is to purge that concept of
the very ideals that bind the diverse people called Americans together."
SEMONCHE, supra note 39, at 3.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss2/2
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justice within the rule of law, this poses definitional problems
similar to those that attend democracy. As one commentator
has noted, thinking about justice in non-Western cultures in-
volves a range of experiences and behaviors that possesses un-
familiar and disparate semantic and cultural boundaries.42
Beginning with the Qur'an itself, which emphatically en-
joins Muslims to dispense justice,43 it is clear that the ideal of
justice resonates throughout the course of Islamic history.44
The ideal of justice is a consistent theme in Muslim perspec-
tives on the current conflict between Israel and the Palestini-
ans. It is especially significant in Shi'ism, as is evident from the
earliest times in the discourses of Imam 'Ali as reported in the
Nahj al-Balaghah.4 5 In modern times, the ideal of justice is
strongly asserted in Ayatollah Khomeini's speeches and writ-
42 Lawrence Rosen, Justice in Islamic Culture and Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON
ISLAMIC LAW, JUSTICE, AND SOCIETY 33 (R.S. Khare ed., 1999).
43 See FARID ESACK, THE QUR'AN: A USER'S GUIDE 177 (2005) ("Justice receives
such prominence in the Qur'an that it is regarded as one of the reasons why God
created the earth ... ."). See also id. ("Lo! Allah enjoineth justice ....") (quoting
the Qur'an 16:90); see also id. at 178 ("0 you who have attained unto faith! Be ever
steadfast in upholding justice ....") (quoting the Qur'an 4:135).
44 See id. at 33-52 (discussing the meaning ofjustice in Islam). See also MAJID
KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE (1984). The rule of law in the
Islamic context is often equated with the promotion of human rights, similar to the
context in which it was used in President Clinton's national security strategy. See
id. For example, Sabah al Mukhtar writes that:
Translating the term 'rule of law' into Arabic as Hukm al-Qanum, found
almost no reference to these words [in Arabic law books] .... [Aire we
talking about a subject that Arab lawyers, jurists, judges and practition-
ers do not think or write about? Probably this is one of the questions
which I will leave to others to consider. I have, however, found a number
of terms which come near the subject, as a component of the rule of law or
a consequence of the application of the rule of law in a country. These
include terms such as human rights (huquq al-insan), limiting state pow-
ers (taqid sultat al-dawla), equality (al-mussawat), and basic freedoms
(al-hurriyat al-asasya).
Sabah al Mukhtar, The Rule of Law in Iraq: Does It Exist? in THE RULE OF LAW IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS 74 (Eugene Cotran & Mai Yamani eds., 2000). He attributes the absence of
the rule of law in Iraq under Saddam Hussein both to the regime's failure to apply
rights guaranteed to the people by the Constitution, and to the severe deprivations
caused by U.S. and U.N. sanctions against Iraq. See id. at 74-80.
45 MURTADA MUTAHHARI, GLIMPSES OF THE NAHJ AL-BALAGHAH 124 (1997).
"Establishment of justice has been declared as being the objective of the mission of
all the prophets. The sanctity of justice is so stressed that it is considered the aim
of all the prophetic missions." Id. According to Imam 'Ali, "Justice is one of the
values revived by Islam and given an extraordinary status .... From 'Ali's view-
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ings, in which it constitutes the touchstone for the 1979 Iranian
revolution against the perceived injustices and Western depen-
dency of the Shah's secular regime.46 It is, however, really the
promise of justice that sustains this ideal, just as it is the prom-
ise of the eventual return of the Imam Mahdi that is central to
Shi'a faith."7 The promise of justice inherent in the Shari'a has
nourished Islamic civilization in the face of frequently corrupt,
repressive governments. 48 A rule of law that is not somehow
associated with the promise of justice, even if not part of its def-
inition, is inconsistent with Islam and cannot survive. But like
human rights, justice may better be viewed as a value served
by, rather than an element of, the rule of law.
I suggest that the middle approach can best inform a study
of the rule of law in the Islamic world that is both genuinely
Islamic, that speaks to core Islamic values such as equality and
justice, and at the same time is also accessible to a Western ob-
server and consistent with Western tradition. To start, consti-
tutionalism has a strong pedigree in classical Islamic history.
The independence of the religious and legal scholars (the ulama
and the fuqaha) from dominance and control by the secular
leaders (the caliphs, sultans, and shahs) sustained a real sepa-
ration of powers that limited the discretion of the rulers and
protected the people to a significant extent from arbitrary con-
trol.49 The judges and the scholars, not the secular rulers,
point, it is the principle of justice that is of crucial significance in preserving the
balance of society ...... "Id. at 131-39.
46 See RAY TAKEYH, HIDDEN IRAN 12 (2006). See also IMAM RUHOLLAH
KHOMEINI, ISLAM AND REVOLUTION I: WRITINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF IMAM
KHOMEINI (1941-1980) 65-66 (Hamid Algar ed. & trans., 1981). According to
Khomeini:
To assume the function of government does not in itself carry any particu-
lar merit or status; rather it is a means for fulfilling the duty of imple-
menting the law and establishing the Islamic order of justice .... It is the
duty of the Imams and the just fuqaha to use government institutions to
execute divine law, establish the just Islamic order, and serve mankind.
KHOMEINI, supra, at 65-66
47 See Sam Knight, Al-Askariya Shrine: 'Not Just A Major Cathedral,'
TIMESONLINE, Feb. 22, 2006, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol1news/
worldliraq/article733713.ece.
48 SANDRA MACKEY, THE IRANIANS: PERSIA, ISLAM, AND THE SOUL OF A NATION
103 (1996). "As with the same concept in pre-Islamic Iran, the ideal of justice in
Islam was, and is, ingrained in the yearnings of the soul rather than the logic of
the mind." Id.
49 WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAw 205 (2005).
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owned the law. While the rulers exercised broad executive pow-
ers and could make rules supplementary to the Shari'a, their
legitimacy and survival were dependent on the support of the
scholars as the keepers of the only law that commanded the
"civic reverence" of the people. As Professor Hallaq has noted,
"It was this reality - which made the approval of the men of law
indispensable to the acts of politics - that gave formative Islam
what we call today the rule of law."50
The compatibility of Islamic law and governance with the
rule of law in its narrow sense was also evident during Islam's
classical era. The work of the legal scholars in consolidating
and compiling the hadith, the development of the madhhabs
(the schools of law), and the reliance of the muftis (legal inter-
preters) on these works in issuing fatwas (legal rulings) to
judges and interested parties, all led to a stability and consis-
tency in the law and legal procedures that prevailed throughout
the Islamic world.51 The courts were open to, and used often by,
the people to seek redress of their grievances not only against
each other, but also against the government and its officials. 52
The judges were usually and sometimes famously noted for
their independence from political control.53 This sophisticated
legal system in turn helped support the artistic, scientific, and
commercial achievements of the classical era - achievements
that a Western scholar like Joseph Raz might well argue are
the virtues, if not inevitable outcomes, of a society based on the
rule of law.
To be sure, as in any society and historical period, there
were exceptions to the general observance of the rule of law;
The dire need for political legitimacy imposed on the ruling powers the imperative
of compliance with the law, and if they manipulated their way out of such compli-
ance - which at times they did - it was an act that could not have been so signifi-
cant as to deprive them of the mantle of legally approved political legitimacy.
Id. See also KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY
(2004). Throughout Islamic history, the jurists (ulema) performed a wide range of
economic, political, and administrative functions and, most important, acted as ne-
gotiatory mediators between the ruling classes and the laity.... While they legiti-
mated and often explained the rulers to the ruled, the jurists also used their moral
weight to thwart tyrannous measures and at times led or legitimated rebellions
against the ruling classes. ABou EL FADL, supra, at 14-16.
50 HALLAQ, supra note 49, at 205.
51 See id. at 200-04; see also FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM 80-81 (2d ed., 1979).
52 EL FADL, supra note 49, at 14-16.
53 See id. at 16.
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judges were not always altruistic, and rulers could be arbitrary
and brutal. Moreover, this history eventually saw constraints
placed on the continued development of Islamic jurisprudence
that has affected the rule of law in modern times. Reasoning by
analogy (qiyas) eventually became for many Sunni scholars the
only legitimate source of developing new legal rulings. 54 While
the promulgation of positive legal rules (qanun) by secular rul-
ers was increasingly used to supplement the Shari'a,55 main-
stream Sunni jurisprudence began to resist renewed
interpretation of the original legal texts. The principle of con-
sensus (ijma) of the legal scholars as a source of law led to the
famous "closing of the door" to ijtihad (intellectual effort to de-
rive new legal rulings from the sources of the divine law) after
the first three centuries of the Islamic era, that is, around the
mid-tenth century (though the extent of this closure is debata-
ble).56 By then, the immense volume of hadith had been col-
lected, thoroughly examined, and agreed upon, with some
variations among the four Sunni schools of law. The inherent
conceptual difficulty of deriving through ijtihad a consistent,
clear, and relatively permanent set of rules from the sources of
Islamic law to meet modern social conditions is perhaps the
most important problem facing modern scholars and leaders to-
day who seek to renew or expand the scope of the Shari'a as a
basis for their states' legal systems.57 Nevertheless, when
54 See RAHMAN, supra note 51, at 71-75.
55 Id. at 80. A small body of secular legislation was created as early as the
Abbasid Caliphate in order to supplement the Shari'a, but became more developed
during the era of the Ottoman Empire. Id. The term qanun has the connotation of
scientific as well as positive law. Letter from Dr. Khosrow Badiozamani to author
(Mar. 28, 2002) (on file with author).
56 See, e.g., Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?, XVI INT'L. J.
MIDDLE E. STUD. 3 n.1 (Mar. 1984).
57 See generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES
(1997). Hallaq states: "[T]here is little question that dissatisfaction with the
means and results of legal reform permeates many levels of Muslim society, partic-
ularly the educated religious elite." Id. at 211. He describes two current responses
to this problem: the secular, which favors the complete displacement of Islamic law
by western codes and procedures; the traditional, which seeks to return to a sys-
tem based on a "pure" (traditional) version of the Shari'a (such as in Saudi Arabia);
and two trends he calls "religious utilitarianism" and "religious liberalism" that
together seek "the reformulation of legal theory in a manner that brings into suc-
cessful synthesis the basic religious values of Islam, on the one hand, and a sub-
stantive law that is suitable to the needs of a modern and changing society, on the
other." Id. at 213-14.
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viewed from the perspective of the rule of law as described here,
the contours and issues of this struggle should be easily recog-
nizable to a Western student.
The Ottoman and Safavid empires, along with the Mughal
Empire to the East, initiated the "modern" era of Islam in the
sense that, to a much greater extent than in the past, the state
and its law became dominant and significant in the lives of vir-
tually all the people.58 The rulers themselves exercised greater
personal authority to make and enforce law.5 9 In a system in
which God is sovereign and democracy historically absent, did
the conditions for the rule of law (constitutionalism and formal
legality) exist either in theory or in practice in these empires?
The short answer is yes. Despite increased centralization
and bureaucratization of the regimes, including greater control
by the state over its legal actors and institutions, in terms of
constitutionalism the political class and the legal class contin-
ued to operate in a rough balance of power, with the Sultans
and Shahs observant of and subservient to the Shari'a.60 In
terms of formal legality, despite the proliferation of qanun and
state-controlled courts, the Shari'a maintained its importance
in providing legitimacy to, and relative stability and clarity of,
legal rules throughout the system. In these empires, the
Shari'a courts were more independent of political control and
less open to corruption and abuse of discretion than the state
tribunals. Contrary to "a regular theme in Western discourses
on the subject," Shari'a courts in Ottoman and Safavid times
tended to "operate consistently and predictably with its particu-
lar combination of Shari'a, government statutes and custom re-
lating to time and place." 61
58 See WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 39-40
(2004).
59 See id.
60 See BERNARD LEWIS, FROM BABEL TO DRAGOMANS: INTERPRETING THE MID-
DLE EAST 115 (2004). The Sultan was not a true despot, but the supreme custodian
of the God-given Holy Law of Islam, to which he himself was subject. It is true
that the Holy Law granted him almost despotic power, and that it did not provide
for its own enforcement against him. But ultimately the Holy Law remained the
basis of the social and political structure of the Empire, and was observed by the
Sultans, whose sovereignty was accepted and respected by the people, both Mus-
lims and Christian, as right and inevitable. Id. at 118.
61 SAMI ZUBAIDA, LAW AND POWER IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD 70 (2003).
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But in the late modern period, dominated in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries by European colonialism, which re-
sulted in the widespread introduction of Western legal codes
and institutions and the relegation of the ulama to the periph-
ery of the political-legal system, the rule of law as it had existed
previously broke down. In the words of one scholar, "[h]aving
codified the law on the basis of Western legal models, and hav-
ing virtually decimated the infrastructure of the traditional le-
gal profession, the nation-state jettisoned Islamic law
altogether and reigned supreme as the unchallenged center of
legal and political power."62 Both aspects of constitutionalism
were disrupted by the experience of Western colonialism.
Structurally, the marginalization of the ulama removed an ef-
fective check on the power of the secular rulers. As a result, it
has been noted that modern Arab constitutions are used to con-
solidate power, not disperse it.63 Additionally, despite the
views of many reformers that modernity required the adoption
of European-style codes and laws, the new legal frameworks,
especially constitutional structures, were, and still are, often
seen as foreign and illegitimate. In terms of formal legality, rel-
egation of the Shari'a to a few areas such as family law, or in
some cases its abolition, removed those restraints that had been
reasonably effective even in Ottoman and Safavid times in lim-
iting the complete discretion of the rulers to create and change
law (qanun) and control the personnel and work of the courts, to
the detriment of stability and clarity in the law, of judicial inde-
pendence, and of due process in judicial procedures. Of course
there were and are many exceptions, including judges who have
maintained their independence in the face of official pressure to
conform to government policies.6 4 But the contours of the prob-
lem when measured against the rule of law criteria are clear.
62 Wael B. Hallaq, "Muslim Rage" and Islamic Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1705,
1713 (2003).
63 See NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD:
ARAB BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 161-80
(2002). Brown notes that the first Islamic state in Medina was based on the rule of
law, in which the organs and agencies of the government were subject to the same
legal system (the Shari'a) that governed the individual citizen. That model, how-
ever, was almost immediately abandoned in the political struggle over leadership
of the Islamic empire and the development of the caliphate. Id. at 168-69.
64 See Not Yet a Democracy, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2005 (regarding politics in
Egypt).
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As a result of these historical developments, the rule of law
remains undernourished in the modern Islamic Middle East. In
many of the successor states to the Ottoman Empire - Syria
and Iraq, for example - where Islamic law has receded, one
clearly sees the consequences of this history for the rule of law:
arbitrary government, constitutions without constitutionalism,
and a serious deficit in formal legality. In post-Safavid Iran,
although the country was never formally colonized, these devel-
opments triggered escalating conflicts between the ulama and
the government. 65 They destabilized the separation of powers
and reduced the legitimacy and authority of the secular Qajar
and Pahlavi shahs which, despite the aggressive Westerniza-
tion program of Reza Shah and his son in the twentieth century,
eventually led to the revolutionary assumption of governmental
power by the ulama in 1979.66
Yet the idea of the rule of law, as noted earlier, has enjoyed
a resurgence in the current debate over the future direction of
the Muslim world. Today, it is in Iran that the struggle over
reviving the rule of law within an Islamic framework is perhaps
most visibly being played out. Although it is a predominantly
Shi'ite country, the struggle for the rule of law in Iran, and ar-
guments over its compatibility with Islamic law, are closely fol-
lowed throughout the Middle East as well as the West.67 Iran
is, in many respects, one of the most modern countries in the
Middle East, with a relatively large urban population of young,
educated and active men and women, many of whom openly ex-
press admiration for the West and America. 68 At the same
65 See generally Washington State University Website on World Civilizations,
http://www.wsu.eduk-dee/SHA/MODERN.HTM (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
66 See generally id.
67 See Thomas Friedman, Iran and the War of Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2002, at A23. Friedman has stated, "If Iranian thinkers and politicians were ever
to blend constitutional democracy with a redefined Islam that limits itself to in-
spiring social norms, not running a state, it could have a positive impact on the
whole Muslim world, from Morocco to Indonesia, that Iran's Islamic revolution
never had." Id.; see also Afshin Molavi, The Disenchantment, 27 WILSON QUAR-
TERLY 48 (2003). Molavi notes, "Today, a different movement within Iran has
caught the attention of Muslim intellectuals and dissidents: the movement toward
democracy. The only internal argument seems to be over whether to seek a secular
democracy or the Islamic democracy that leading reformists call for." Id. at 55.
68 See generally Nazila Fathi, Iran: The Next Revolution? Iran's Population is
Mostly Young, Educated, and Frustrated with the Country's Social Restrictions.
And They're Starting to Make Noise, N.Y. TIMES Up FRONT, Jan. 10, 2003, avail-
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time, the government flaunts its independent, even anti-West-
ern credentials, and more than a few intellectuals are vocal in
their rejection of Western cultural domination (what some have
termed "west-toxification").69 This dynamic and complex scene
helps make developments in Iran especially relevant to many
Muslims, Sunni and Shi'ite alike.
The opening act of the drama of the Islamic revolution and
the rule of law was the Ayatollah Khomeini's establishment of
government by the Islamic jurist (velayat-e faqih).70 This con-
cept of rule by Islamic jurists is not one that is consistent with
Shi'a tradition, which was characterized throughout most of its
history by the Shi'a ulama's distrust of and distance from gov-
ernment and political rule. The velayat-e-faqih is revolutionary
in both Iranian political history and Shi'a tradition. In perhaps
no other modern country (with the possible exception of Saudi
Arabia) has the constitutional requirement, inherent within the
able at http://www.thefreelibrary.comIran%3a+the+next+revolution%3f+Iran's+
population+is+mostly+young%2c. . .-a096501241; Iran's Frustrated Generation,
BBC News, Jul. 10, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/3053383.stm (last
visited November 18, 2007).
69 The term "west-toxification" (in Persian, gharb zadegi) has become popular
among Iranian intellectuals. See ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH, REASON, FREEDOM, & DE-
MOCRACY IN IsLAM: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH 161 (Mahmoud
Sadri & Ahmad Sadri eds. & trans., 2000). A prominent and (among "liberals")
extremely popular contemporary Iranian philosopher, Soroush has ascribed two
meanings to the term. The first, and most common, is "the nauseating imitation of
everything western even at the expense of immolating the most eminent cultural
assets and legacies of our own: speaking with their tongue, thinking with their
brain, looking through their eyes, and wailing their pain." Id. at 160. Soroush,
however, also ascribes a second meaning to the term. "It maintains that our Is-
lamic and native cultures are long past their prime, that they are exhausted and
depleted. In this view the Islamic and native cultures are incapable of revival and
renewal, having been superseded by the West." Id. at 161. The former view, he
asserts, "implies a critical approach to the Western culture ... the West must be
carefully examined but vigorously resisted. The useful elements must be absorbed
and the harmful rejected .... But the second interpretation inspires passivity and
feebleness of merely observing ones [sic] own predestined fate." Id.
70 A discussion of the velayat-e faqih can be found in Khomeini's various writ-
ings prior to the 1979 Iranian revolution. See KHOMEINI, supra note 46. Daniel
Brumberg has summarized the doctrine as one that evolved through several itera-
tions into a theory of government that combines primary judicial, legislative, and
executive power in the hands of clerics, and particularly in one prominent religious
guide (marja'), who is especially just, moral, and knowledgeable, and therefore has
the duty to rule as the expert (faqih). See DANIEL BRUMBERG, REINVENTING
KHOMEINI: THE STRUGGLE FOR REFORM IN IRAN 81-97 (2001).
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velayat-e-faqih, that all laws be based on Islamic criteria been
taken so seriously.71
The second act in this drama, commencing with the death
of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989,72 but most prominently follow-
ing the 1997 election of Mohammed Khatami as President of
Iran, 73 was the effort to convert the velayat-e-faqih into a repub-
71 Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'i Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran], art. 4 [1980], available at http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-
info/Government/constitution.html. Article 4 of the Constitution requires that "All
civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and
other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle ap-
plies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all
laws and regulations .... Id.
72 The role of the rule of law in shaping the future of the Islamic Republic was
debated extensively in the years immediately following the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini in 1989. For example, the rule of law was discussed at length in the
Parliament (majles) before and after the election of May 1992, where delegates
debated many of the elements of the rule of law discussed here: creating a national
consensus that the Shari'a is the constitutional basis for the rule of law, a better
definition of separation of powers within the government, the absence of due pro-
cess and therefore justice in the conduct of secret trials, and especially the current
absence and need for stable and clear laws to guide political, economic, and social
decisions. BRUMBERG, supra note 70, at 175-84. A review of major Iranian news-
papers from 1999 to 2003, available in translation from the Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Service (FBIS), reveals extensive and frequent references to the rule of
law in speeches and commentary reported by the Iranian media. See, e.g., MPs Say
Corruption Can Be Uprooted Through Rule of Law, Gov't Accountability, TEHRAN
TIMES, July 3, 2001; Khatami appeals to hard-liners, THE IRAN BRIEF, June 7,
1999; Interior Minister: Only Rule of Law Can Guarantee Security, TEHRAN TIMES,
Oct. 14, 2000.
73 The main themes of President Khatami's 1997 election campaign have been
described as "the institutionalization of the rule of law, the expansion of the press,
addressing the needs of the young and elevating the role of women in society."
ANsAi, supra note 27, at 125-26. It has been noted that Mr. Khatami, besides
enjoying the support of the vast majority of his people, understands, and agrees
with, those "nonnegotiable demands of human dignity" that Mr. Bush adumbrated
during his state-of-the-union address: "the rule of law, limits on the power of the
state, respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious
tolerance." How Not to Make a Friend of Iran; Iran and America, ECONOMIST, Feb.
9, 2002, at 40. Said Amir Aijomand writes:
His [Khatami's] advocacy of the rule of law and civil society has set in
motion a constitutional crisis that marks a new phase in the history of
post-revolution Iran. By far the most important and repeated slogan of
Khatami's election campaign was hokumat-e qanun (the rule of law). The
implicit contrast to hokumat-e eslami (Islamic government)... stands out
clearly in hindsight. A novel and consistent political discourse has grown
around Khatami's theory of political development under the rule of law, a
discourse which stands in sharp contrast to the Islamic revolutionary dis-
course and rhetoric.
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lic based both on the Shari'a and the rule of law. The frame-
work for understanding the rule of law as described here was
clearly evident as this act unfolded.
As noted earlier, the Khatami presidential campaign was
based on the promise to promote the rule of law and civil soci-
ety. Said Amir Arijomand summarized the significance of this
campaign, writing that:
[Khatami's] advocacy of the rule of law and civil society has
set in motion a constitutional crisis that marks a new phase in the
history of post-revolution Iran. By far, the most important and
repeated slogan of Khatami's election campaign was hokumat-e
qanun (the rule of law). The implicit contrast to hokumat-e es-
lami (Islamic government) stands out clearly in hindsight. A
novel and consistent political discourse has grown around
Khatami's theory of political development under the rule of law, a
discourse which stands in sharp contrast to the Islamic discourse
and rhetoric. 74
During the Khatami era, the liberal Iranian press fre-
quently emphasized the compatibility of the rule of law with the
Shari'a, especially within Shi'ite tradition. 75 However, in terms
of formal legality, there are difficulties in reconciling (and
therefore legitimizing) new laws that are necessary to address
the conditions and problems of a modern society, and that meet
the rule of law criteria of clarity and stability, while also re-
maining wholly consistent with the Shari'a as required by the
Constitution. These difficulties are evident in the confusing va-
riety of legislation that, without a clear basis in the Shari'a, has
been derived from such ambiguous and controversial legislative
Said Amir Arjomand, Civil Society and the Rule of Law in the Constitutional Polit-
ics of Iran under Khatami, Soc. RESEARCH, Summer 2000, at 1, available at http:ll
www.findarticles.com/cf dls/m2267/2_67/63787333/print.html.
74 Arjomand, supra note 73, at 1-2. Arjomand notes, however, that Khatami
has not disassociated the rule of law from Islamic principles, only from certain
constitutional problems that had arisen in the course of development of the ve-
layat-e faqih. The President nevertheless took the occasion to emphasize that the
rule of law was the most fundamental principle of the Islamic revolution, and that
only through 'its main manifestation, the Constitution, can many of the principles
of the revolution such as piety, justice, national reconciliation, national security
and freedom find real meaning. Id. at 3.
75 ANsARi, supra note 27, at 126-27.
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principles as "interest of the state" and "emergency."76 Laws in
Iran today often lack durability and consistency, and the crea-
tion of new law is not subject to open, general, and stable rules,
which are essential rule of law characteristics. This has led
many in Iran to question whether the regime has become Is-
lamic in name only, and to reject or resist further reliance on
these ambiguous legal categories. 77
Furthermore, political trials of journalists, intellectuals,
and others viewed as threats to the regime have revealed an
absence of due process and judicial independence in the legal
system.78 Criminal charges are often vague, 79 allegations of
torture are frequent,8 0 and some trials can be conducted in se-
cret.81 Both the official and unofficial law enforcement organi-
76 ASHGAR SCHIRAZI, THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN: POLITICS AND THE STATE OF
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 161-253 (John O'Kane trans., I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1997).
77 Id. at 171-72.
78 The conduct of trials by Revolutionary Courts against "reformists" and
others who criticize the regime has led the executive director of the Middle East
and North Africa division of Human Rights Watch to comment that "[t]he judicial
authorities are making a mockery of [the] rule of law in Iran." Nazila Fathi, Hard-
Liners Put Iranian Journalist on Trial on Spying Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2002, at A13. The former President of Iran, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, de-
fended the closure of "reformist" newspapers on the grounds that "they're putting
freedom before Islam, freedom before faith." Susan Sachs, Top Iranian Cleric De-
fends Closing of Reformist Publications, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000, at Al.
79 See, e.g., To Prison, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2001, at 42 ("setting up a group
aiming to destroy national security"), Green Danger, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2000, at
59 ("spreading propaganda against the regime"), Amy Waldman, Iran Intensifies
Crackdown on Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2001, at A8 (intending to "weaken
the faith of students and youth in religion and Islamic principles"); Nazila Fathi,
Iran Sentences Reformist to Death for Insult to Prophet Muhammad, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2002, at A8 ("insulting the Prophet Muhammad" by saying that "Muslims
should not follow religious leaders 'blindly"')..
80 See Elaine Sciolino, A Lifelong Dissident Defies Iran's Rulers on Torture,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at A3.
81 Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'i Isla'mai Iran, [The Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran] art. 165 [1980] available at http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-
info/Governmentlconstitution.html. Article 165 of the Iranian Constitution states:
"Trials are to be held openly and members of the public may attend without any
restriction; unless the court determines that an open trial would be detrimental to
public morality or discipline, or if in case of private disputes, both the parties re-
quest not to hold open hearing." Id. The exception for cases involving "public mo-
rality or discipline" has been applied frequently. See, e.g., Nazila Fathi, Court
Disbands Iranian Party, Sentencing 33 Members to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002,
at A4. In May 2000, thirteen Iranians (eleven Jewish and two Muslim) were tried
on charges of spying for Israel. The trials, which received extensive coverage in
the Western press, were conducted in secret "for national security reasons." Susan
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zations are often selective and politically motivated in their
activities, which are frequently directed at controlling certain
groups, including women and students, rather than guided and
restrained by impartial rules.8 2
Moreover, despite the assumption of political power by the
ulama, the elements necessary for the other aspect of the rule of
law, the development of constitutionalism, have been subverted
by the failure to create the constitutional framework necessary
to disperse power, and by the failure of the government to ac-
quire the legitimacy necessary to sustain constitutionalism.8 3
Sachs, First of Iranian Spy Suspects is Tried and Confesses on TV, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2000, at Al; see also Susan Sachs, 10 Jews Convicted by Iranian Court in
Espionage Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2002, at 11. Five of the accused were acquit-
ted, and the remainder received jail sentences of up to thirteen years. Iran Par-
dons Five Jews Jailed as Spies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at A3. Three were
pardoned in October, 2002, two completed their sentences, and the others received
pardons in February 2003. Id.
82 Along with the regular police and the armed forces, Iran's security forces
include the Revolutionary Guards (a militia organization), the basij (a volunteer
paramilitary organization), and the morals police. These are all under the control
of the supreme leader (rahbar). See Islam's Bully-boys, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2000,
at 48. [T]he hardline establishment, when it is doing well, as it is now, regularly
sets off one of its most powerful weapons, the ideologically-driven gangs of young
men who believe that they are fighting for Islam. Some of these youngsters are
members of the Revolutionary Guard, others belong to the Islamic basij militia.
They are there to take on dissidents or, indeed, anybody who flouts the rules. Id.
at 48.
83 Between 1905 and 1911, Iran experienced a "Constitutional Revolution" in
response to the corruption of the declining Qajar dynasty, poor economic condi-
tions, and exposure to contemporary Western ideas. See MACKEY, supra note 48,
at 136. Sandra Mackey has stated that:
[I]t was the Constitutional Revolution, through the establishment of a
parliament, which defined a new source of authority in Iran - that of the
people. Although originally conceived in terms of Western liberalism,
Iran's "house of justice" took root in soil containing the Persian concept of
the righteous king and the Islamic tradition of justice. Deprived of most
of its goals by domestic dispute and foreign intervention [by Russia and
Great Britain], the Constitutional Revolution had grappled with ideas in-
troduced by the West, took a stand for national independence, philosoph-
ically limited the power of the king, and debated the relationship between
the law of man and the law of God. All laid the foundation of contempo-
rary Iran.
Id. at 124. Though short-lived, that period retains an importance and immediacy
to modern Iranian reformers. See AFSHIN MOHLEVI, PERSIAN PILGRIMAGES 209-25
(2002). Arguably, the continuing relevance of the Constitutional Revolution to cur-
rent reformers is due in part to its incorporation of rule of law themes, including
justice and the source of laws that are not solely Western concepts, but are also
consistent with Persian-Islamic tradition. Early drafts of the 1979 Constitution
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol19/iss2/2
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Among other structural problems, the Iranian constitution
places control of the judiciary exclusively in the hands of the
unelected supreme leader (the rahbar).8 4 All legislation must
be approved by the Guardian Council,8 5 a body whose members
are appointed by the rahbar8 6 without effective supervision by
the parliament, and whose power of judicial review is virtually
unlimited.8 7 The Guardian Council consists of six religious men
appointed directly by the rahbar,8 8 and six legally-trained ju-
rists selected by the Parliament (majles) from a slate of twelve
individuals nominated by the head of judiciary,8 9 who is himself
appointed by the rahbar.90 The Council reviews all laws for
consistency both with the Constitution and with Islamic law. 91
It also approves all candidates for political office on the basis of
their Islamic suitability.92 President Khatami's modest legisla-
tive efforts to correct this structural problem at least demon-
reflected this relevance; in the words of one drafter, Nasser Katouzian, "We tried
to mesh two very important points: the necessity of a democratic republic and the
principles of Islamic law. We reasoned that sovereignty is essentially from God,
but this sovereignty is a donation, a gift, from God to the people as a whole and not
to any particular man." GENEIvE ABDO & JONATHAN LYONS, ANSWERING ONLY TO
GOD: FAITH AND FREEDOM IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY IRAN 94-95 (2003).
84 Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'i Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran] 157 [1980] available at http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/
Government/constitution.html. Article 157 of the Iranian Constitution states: In
order to fulfill the responsibilities of the judiciary power in all the matters concern-
ing judiciary, administrative and executive areas, the Leader shall appoint a just
Mujtahid well versed in judiciary affairs and possessing prudence and administra-
tive as the head of the judiciary power for a period of five years who shall be the
highest judicial authority. Id.
85 Id. art. 94.
86 Id. art. 91.
87 See generally SCHIRAZI, supra note 76, at 175-248.
88 Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'i Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran] art. 91 [19801 available at http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-
info/Government/constitution.html.
89 Id. art. 91.
90 Id. art. 157.
91 Id. arts. 94, 96.
92 See generally Nazila Fathi, Iran's President Trying to Limit Power of
Clergy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at Al. For a thorough analysis of the Islamic
Republic's constitutional development and the ensuing contradictions between Is-
lamic law and governance (velayat-e faqih) on one hand, and current actual legal
and political practices on the other, see generally ScHIRAZi, supra note 76. Rule of
law elements from the 1906-1911 Constitutional Revolution were contained in
early drafts of the 1979 constitution, such as membership and voting restrictions
on the Guardian Council that would limit the ability of any one group (such as the
clerics) to dominate the Council's review of all legislation for consistency with the
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strated his recognition of the importance of this aspect of
constitutionalism to the rule of law.93
President Khatami was also keenly aware of the impor-
tance of governmental legitimacy in developing the constitu-
tionalism necessary to support the rule of law. He spoke and
wrote of the need for an "intellectual and psychological accept-
ance" of the law and the legal system by every individual within
the polity as fundamental to the rule of law in the Islamic Re-
public, noting that such acceptance had been absent in Iran's
recent history.94 The well-known stories of Tehran taxicab driv-
ers refusing to pick up passengers dressed in clerical robes is
anecdotal evidence of the problem of constitutional legitimacy
in Iran today.95
Despite these various rule of law problems, Shi'a tradition
has always encouraged vigorous debate and interpretation of
the Shari'a.96 The minority status and persecution of Shi'ites
throughout much of history led to a natural rejection of consen-
sus (ijma) as a source of law. Tlhe acceptance of the law-making
authority of the Imams, with highly qualified religious scholars
(the mujtahids) gradually assuming this authority in the ab-
sence of the hidden Imam Mahdi, has allowed Shi'a jurispru-
dence to continue to develop on the basis of reason (aql).97 In
Iran, this tradition, coupled with periodic suppression of the re-
ligious class by Iran's secular rulers and resentment by intellec-
Shari'a. Id. at 19; see also ABDO & LYONS, supra note 83, at 90-97. These rule of
law elements were later removed in the final version of the current constitution.
93 The proposed legislation would restrict the Guardian Council's veto power
over legislation, and would remove the power to approve political candidates from
the Council to the Interior Ministry, which is controlled by the office of the Presi-
dent. It would also increase the power of the President over the courts, which are
currently under the exclusive supervision and control of Ayatollah Ali Khameini,
the unelected rahbar. See Ali Akbar Dareini, Khatemi Challenges Hardliners,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at A5; Nazila Fathi, Iran's President Trying to Limit
Power of Clergy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2002, at Al; Editorial, Fighting for Reform in
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2002, at A30.
94 ALI ASGHAR HAGHDAR, GoFT-t-MAN FARHANGI SIASI KHATAMI [THE CUL-
TURAL-POLITIcAL DISCOURSE OF KHATAMI] 86 (1999) (translated for the author by
Dr. Manijeh Badiozamani, Feb. 27, 2002).
95 Such a scene is depicted in the popular Iranian comedy film MARMOULAK
(THE LIZARD) (Antlantis/Faradis, 2004).
96 For studies of the historical development of Shi'a Islam, see HEINZ HALM,
SHI'A ISLAM: FROM RELIGION TO REVOLUTION (1996), and MooJAN MOMEN, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO SHI'I ISLAM (1985).
97 See MOMEN, supra note 96, at 185-88.
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tuals of growing Western influence and involvement in Iranian
affairs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, enabled the
Ayatollah Khomeini to promote and then implement his revolu-
tionary theory of velayat-e faqih.98 But it also constitutes a
foundation for the continuing debate by intellectuals, jurists,
and citizens in Iran over the possibility of constructing a mod-
ern Islamic society on a foundation of the rule of law. This is a
debate with which Western lawyers can empathize.
What, then, does this brief survey, and the Persian story
that I have related, teach us? In order to succeed, the rule of
law in a modern Islamic state must be tied conceptually to the
ideal of justice; a strictly positivist orientation will not suffice in
an Islamic context. The constitutional foundation of the rule of
law must not only relate to Islamic jurisprudential values and
traditions, but also must contain structural provisions, includ-
ing an independent judiciary, that effectively disperse rather
than consolidate power. Finally, attention must be paid to key
areas of rules and rule-making, especially the need for stable
rules, due process, and rule-bound law enforcement agencies.
None of these prescriptions are inherently inconsistent with Is-
lamic law or history; they are not culturally dependent, and are
applicable equally to a country with an Islamic tradition as to a
Western liberal democracy. They are all still being tested in
Iran today, which suggests that the rule of law can transcend
the stigma of identification with Western culture, while retain-
ing the elements essential to securing the conditions and values
that I have discussed.
Paddy Ashdown, the United Nations High Representative
for Bosnia in the 1990s, wrote that "in Bosnia we thought that
democracy was the highest priority .... In hindsight, we should
have put the establishment of the rule of law first."99 Soon
thereafter, just after the American invasion of Iraq in March of
2003, he again wrote, "[a]s in Bosnia, so in Iraq, everything de-
pends on the early establishment of the rule of law: a function-
ing economy, a free and fair political system, the development of
civil society, public confidence in the police and the courts. The
98 See id. at 196, 282-98; see also SCHIRAZI, supra note 76, at 30, 33.
99 Paddy Ashdown, What I Learned in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at
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process is sequential."'100 He was right, although we did not lis-
ten. 10 1 With the foundation of the rule of law in place, people
have the ability to make choices and conduct their activities
with a degree of confidence that they know the "rules of the
road," that those rules will not suddenly and arbitrarily change,
and that the government and courts will enforce the rules fairly
when problems arise. It is these conditions that give people a
stake and confidence in the future of their country. It is not
easy to build and sustain, but the rule of law has roots deep in
both Western and Islamic history and political-legal culture. It
offers common ground for the beginning of a more productive
dialogue and interaction between the Islamic world and the
West. It is a good place to start.
100 Paddy Ashdown, What Baghdad Can Learn from Bosnia, THE GUARDIAN,
Apr. 22, 2003, available at http://www.ohr.int/printcontentid=29758.
101 In his State of the Union address on January 23, 2007, President Bush de-
clared "Our goal is a democratic Iraq that upholds the rule of law, respects the
rights of its people, provides them security and is an ally in the war on terror."
'The State of Our Union Is Strong; Our Cause in the World Is Right,' N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 24, 2007, at A16 (quoting President George W. Bush). Perhaps we are now
beginning to get the sequence right.
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